Extract From the Annual Report of the
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

People’s Republic of China
The Chinese government engages in
systematic and egregious violations of the freedom of
religion or belief. Religious activities are tightly
controlled and some religious adherents were
detained, imprisoned, fined, beaten, and harassed.
Yet, religious communities continue to grow rapidly
in China and the freedom to participate in officiallysanctioned
religious activity increased in many areas
of the country over the past year. High-ranking
Chinese government officials, including President Hu
Jintao, have praised the positive role of religious
communities in China and articulated a desire to have
religious groups promote ―economic and social
development‖—an endorsement that some believe
may open legal space in the future for religious
groups to conduct charitable, medical, and economic
development activities. However, despite a growing
―zone of toleration‖ for religious worship and
charitable activities, the government continues to
restrict religious practice to government-approved
religious associations and seeks to control the
activities, growth, and leadership of both ―registered‖
and ―unregistered‖ religious groups. In addition, the
Chinese government hinders cooperation between
religious communities and co-religionists abroad. In
Tibetan Buddhist areas, religious freedom conditions
may be worse now than at any time since the
Commission‘s inception. In the year leading up to
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the Chinese
government placed severe restrictions on the peaceful
religious activity of Uighur Muslims and increased
the number of arrests and detentions of
―unregistered‖ Protestants, Catholics, Tibetan
Buddhist, and Falun Gong adherents. These
restrictions have not been lifted in the months
following the Olympics. Since 1999, the
Commission has recommended that China be
designated a ―country of particular concern,‖ or CPC.
China has been designated a CPC by the Department
of State since 2000.
The law governing religion in China is the
National Regulations on Religious Affairs (NRRA),
first issued in March 2005 and updated in 2007. The
regulations include provisions that require all
religious groups and religious venues to affiliate with
one of seven government-approved religious
associations. When registered, religious communities
can apply for permission to possess property, provide
social services, accept donations from overseas,
conduct religious education and training, and host
inter-provincial religious meetings. Within the
bounds allowed by the Chinese legal system where
legal protections are sometimes overridden by
political considerations, the NRRA expanded some
protections for registered religious communities to
carry out religious activities. However, the NRRA
imposes restrictions that violate international norms
regarding the protection of the freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion, and it has been used to
justify some arrests. By stipulating registration in
government-sanctioned religious associations,
insisting that permission be sought for most routine
religious activities, and including specific
requirements for government approval of Catholic
and Tibetan Buddhist groups‘ leadership decisions,
the NRRA strengthens governmental management or
supervision of religious affairs, thereby offering Party
officials extensive control over religious practice and
related activities. In addition, vague national security
provisions in the NRRA override stated protections if
a religious group is deemed to disrupt national unity
or solidarity.
The NRRA only protects what the
government considers ―normal‖ religious activity,
making unregistered religious groups illegal and
subject to restriction, harassment or other
punishments, including coercion, forced closure,
beatings, confiscation of personal property, fines, and
criminal prosecution. Enforcement varies by region
and unregistered religious activity is tolerated in
some provinces. Some Catholics, Protestants,
Muslims, and members of spiritual movements have
refused to join the officially-sanctioned religious
organizations due to their reluctance to:

1) provide the names and contact information of their followers;

2) submit leadership decisions to the government or
to one of the government-approved religious
organizations; and 3) seek advance permission from
the government for all major religious activities or
theological positions. During the past year,
Protestant ―house church‖ groups and ―underground‖

Catholic priests faced pressure to register with
government-approved associations increased.
In the lead up to the 2008 Olympic Games,
many unregistered Protestant and Catholic groups
reported increased harassment, detentions, and arrest.
In May 2008, the Beijing Police raided the
unregistered Shouwang Church and ordered the
members to leave and stop meeting. The Shouwang
Church has tried to register with the local
government, but their application has been denied
repeatedly because their clergy was not trained by the
officially recognized Christian association.
―Unregistered‖ Catholic priest Wang Zhong was
sentenced to three years imprisonment for organizing
a July ceremony at a new church that was legally
registered with the government. Provincial
authorities in Sichuan also interfered with the
humanitarian activities sponsored by unregistered
house church Protestants following the May 2008
earthquake. Two Protestants from Henan Province
were detained and questioned about their efforts to
help earthquake victims; they were held for about a
week and ordered to pay a hefty fine for engaging in
―illegal religious activity.

In Tibetan Buddhist and Muslim regions, the
NRRA sets forth additional restrictions on peaceful
religious activity. During the past year, the
government continued to pursue an intense campaign
of ―patriotic education‖ among monks, nuns, and
imams. The government has long required Tibetan
Buddhist and Uighur Muslim religious leaders to
demonstrate political loyalty, but new laws give
provincial officials the power to monitor the training,
assembly, publications, selection, education, and
speeches of Muslim and Tibetan Buddhist leaders.
Patriotic education campaigns are intended to quell
any activities viewed as political dissent and to
promote leaders who are considered ―patriotic and
devoted.‖ In addition to patriotism classes for
clergy, the Education Ministry also announced in
2008 that children in both regions will be required to
attend courses on ―ethnic unity.‖ These classes are a
reaction to the religious and ethnic based uprisings in
Tibet and the unrest in Xinjiang province over the
past few years. Authorities in Lhasa also warned
parents about allowing their children to participate in
religious holidays, including activities such as
visiting or circumambulating temples and deities or
wearing amulet cords. Students failing to comply
with the orders were threatened with expulsion from
school.

Religious repression and restrictions in
Tibetan Buddhist areas continue unabated. Hundreds
of Buddhists monks and nuns are in prison or subject
to intense restrictions on their religious activities,
some monasteries and other holy sites are being
forcibly closed or destroyed, and Chinese officials
have stepped up campaigns to pressure Buddhist
monks and nuns to denounce the Dalai Lama and
show loyalty to the Chinese communist rule. The
Chinese government‘s active attempts to mold and
control the traditional norms of Tibetan Buddhism
have nurtured deep resentments among Tibetans.
On January 1, 2008, the government issued
implementation guidelines for the NRRA in the
Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). The regulations
assert state control over all aspects of Tibetan
Buddhist belief and practice, including more specific
control over the movement and education of monks
and nuns, the building or repairing of religious
venues, and the conducting of large-scale religious
gatherings. When the new implementation guidelines
were issued, official media reports indicated that they
were intended to ―resist the Dalai Clique‘s separatist
activities.‖

In September 2007, the government also
issued regulations allowing it to directly interfere in
the selection of reincarnated lamas, an essential
element of Tibetan Buddhist religious practice.
These rules appear to be intended to ensure
government control over the selection of the next
Dalai Lama. Under the regulations, government
officials must approve the choice of all reincarnated
lamas and no individual or entity outside the country
can influence the selection process. Depending on
the importance of the reincarnation itself, candidates
must receive permission from either provincial level
government officials or from officials in Beijing.
Monasteries must seek government permission to
search for a reincarnated lama and to maintain one in
residence.

These regulations are part of the Chinese
government‘s continued campaign to diminish the
stature and influence of the Dalai Lama among
Tibetans. Zhang Qingli, party secretary of the TAR,
during the closing ceremonies of the Olympic Torch
rally last June, predicted that China would ―smash
completely‖ the Dalai Lama‘s ―separatist plot.‖ He
then referred to the Dalai Lama as a ―wolf in monk‘s
robes‖ and ―a devil with a human face but the heart
of a beast.‖ He dismissed the exiled leader‘s
supporters as the ―scum of Buddhism‖ and ordered
monks, nuns, students, government workers, and
business people throughout Tibet to participate in
patriotic education and publicly denounce the Dalai
Lama. Monks and nuns who refuse to denounce the
Dalai Lama or to pledge loyalty to Beijing have been
expelled from their monasteries, imprisoned, and
tortured. Phurbu Tsering, a Tibetan Buddhist
religious teacher was detained on May 19, 2008 after
police detained more than fifty of his students for
staging a peaceful protest against requirements that
they denounce the Dalai Lama and their teacher. In
October 2008 authorities closed Pangsa Monastery in
Lhasa after an increased flow of Tibetans came to
pay tribute to a statute that had received a blessing
from the Dalai Lama.

Chinese government actions and policies to
suppress peaceful religious activity in Tibetan areas
played a primary role in stoking last year‘s
demonstrations there. On March 10, 2008, the
anniversary of the failed 1959 uprising against
Chinese control of Tibet, monks from Drepung
monastery peacefully protested against patriotic
education and other religious freedom restrictions. In
response, the Chinese government sealed off
monasteries and arrested monks, touching off
demonstrations in Lhasa that led to property
destruction, arrests, and numerous deaths.
Demonstrations spread to Tibetan areas outside the
TAR. For example, on April 14, 2008, Chinese
soldiers fired on several hundred monks and local
residents at the Tongkor monastery in Ganzi
prefecture, Sichuan province; witnesses claim that
between eight and 15 people were killed and others
were arrested. Reports have identified hundreds of
Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns whom security
officials detained for participating in the 2008
protests, in which protesters called for the return of
the Dalai Lama, the release of the Panchen Lama
(Gedun Choekyi Nyima), the end to ―patriotic
education,‖ and more religious freedom in general.

The Chinese government has not provided full details
or a credible accounting of the monks and nuns
detained. Over the past year, a security presence has
remained at some monasteries and nunneries, and
local government officials have escalated their
campaigns to require monks and nuns to sign
statements denouncing the Dalai Lama. In Ganzi
(Kardze) Prefecture, the local government issued
regulations in June 2008 to both punish and remove
from Ganzi monks and nuns accused of participating
in peaceful protests. Punishments include arrest, reeducation,
closure of a monastery or nunnery, and the
forced removal of a religious teacher (reincarnated
trulku) from his position. Ganzi has more political
and religious prisoners than any other Tibetan region
outside of the TAR.

The Chinese government continues to deny
repeated international requests for access to 19-yearold
Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, whom the Dalai Lama
designated as the 11th Panchen Lama when he was
six years old. No one has seen him since, nor have
any independent or transparent interviews taken
place. While he is a ―disappeared‖ person,
government officials claim that he is in fact alive and
well and being ―held for his own safety.‖ They insist
that another boy, Gyaltsen Norbu, is the ―true‖
Panchen Lama. In recent years, Chinese authorities
have, on several occasions, featured Norbu in public
ceremonies where he stresses the importance of
loyalty to the Communist government and endorses
the government‘s official version of Tibetan history.
In the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
(XUAR), governmental repression of religious
freedom increased in the past year. Chinese
government authorities routinely have equated
peaceful religious practices among Uighur Muslims
with religious extremism and separatism and have
used the global war on terror as a pretext to crack
down on even the most peaceful forms of dissent or
religious activity. Uighur Muslim clerics and
students have been detained for various ―illegal‖
religious activities, ―illegal religious centers‖ have
been closed, and police continue to confiscate large
quantities of ―illegal religious publications.‖ XUAR
Party Secretary Wang Lequan stated that the
government would use ―preemptive attacks‖ and
institute ―anti-separatist reeducation‖ in the XUAR to
ensure national safety.

The government continues to limit access to
mosques, including the participation of women,
children, communist party members, and government
employees. All imams in Xinjiang are required to
undergo annual political training seminars to retain
their licenses, and local security forces monitor
imams and other religious leaders. Imams at Uighur
mosques are reportedly required to meet monthly
with officials from the Religious Affairs Bureau and
the Public Security Bureau to receive ―advice‖ on the
content of their sermons. Failure to report to such
meetings can result in the imam‘s expulsion or
detention. Over the past year, XUAR officials have
issued new orders to extend governmental control
over religion. For example, in August 2008,
authorities in Kashgar called for increased
surveillance and management of religious activity. In
June 2008, officials in Kazakh Autonomous
Prefecture called for increased inspections of
mosques and religious venues to prevent ―illegal
reading of scriptures‖ and for the ―infiltration‖ of
religious groups. In June 2008, a mosque near Aksu
city was demolished reportedly for ―illegal
renovations,‖ for having ―illegal copies‖ of the
Koran, and for engaging in ―illegal religious
activities.‖

In February 2009, officials in Hotan
started a campaign to halt ―illegal‖ religious schools.
According to reports, armed security personnel
conducted nighttime searches, closing seven schools
and detaining 39 people. In March 2009, according
to a Radio Free Asia report, Hotan officials stated
that anyone engaged in ―cross-village worship‖ will
be charged with a ―social crime‖ and subject to
detention or fines.

Religious leaders and activists who attempt
to publicize or criticize human rights abuses in the
XUAR have received prolonged prison terms, on
charges of ―separatism,‖ ―endangering social order,‖
and ―incitement to subvert state power.‖ Numerous
Uighur Muslims have been arrested for peacefully
organizing and demonstrating for their religious
freedom, including in the past year. In February
2009, Abdukadir Mahsum was sentenced to 15 years
imprisonment for organizing peaceful demonstrations
promoting religious freedom and other human rights
concerns for Uighurs. In March 2008, Mutallip
Hajim died in detention after being arrested for his
activities helping underground Muslim schools. He
was reportedly tortured, but his family was warned
not to publicize his death. On August 10, 2008,
Imam Adil Qarim was arrested, and has since
disappeared, allegedly because some suspects in a
bomb attack attended his mosque. The imam denied
having any links to the attacks.

Officials in the XUAR prohibit teaching
Islam outside the home to minors, and police have
stepped up attempts to halt private religious
education programs in some parts of Xinjiang
province. Teachers and organizers can be charged
with conducting an ―illegal religious gathering,‖ a
criminal offense. During the Commission‘s 2005
visit to China, local government officials confirmed
that minors were prohibited from participating in any
religious activity or instruction before finishing nine
years of compulsory public education. This policy
contradicts statements made by officials in the central
government who claim that there are no restrictions
prohibiting the religious activities of minors.
Furthermore, in several localities in Xinjiang,
plainclothes police are reportedly stationed outside
mosques to enforce rules forbidding children and
government employees from attending services.

There are also reports that in some areas, individuals
under the age of 30 are prohibited from attending a
mosque. Throughout Xinjiang, teachers, professors,
university students, and other government employees
are prohibited from engaging in religious activities,
such as reciting daily prayers, distributing religious
materials, observing Ramadan, and wearing head
coverings; they are reportedly subject to fines if they
attempt to do so. These standards are enforced more
strictly in southern Xinjiang and other areas where
Uighurs account for a higher percentage of the
population. In March 2009, 600 protestors, mostly
women, marched in Hotan to protest a proposed ban
on headscarves and other religious freedom
restrictions.

Regulations in the XUAR ensure that all
hajj pilgrimages are controlled by the governmentapproved
Chinese Patriotic Islamic Association. To
enforce these regulations, XUAR authorities require
Muslims to surrender their passports to local
government offices for registration. To retrieve their
passports, they must provide detailed information
regarding their hajj travel plans to ensure their
foreign visa is authorized. Uighur human rights
activists outside of China are concerned that this
policy will be used to identify and punish Uighurs
who travel outside of the XUAR. Their worries may
have been proved justified when the government
confiscated the passports of more than 2,000 Uighur
Muslims in 2007 and arbitrarily detained men
between the ages of 50 to 70 for participating in the
hajj.

The State Department estimates that over
1,300 people were arrested in the XUAR on charges
related to state security over the past year, a large
increase from the previous year. Such charges have
been used to detain religious adherents and other
dissidents in the past. Due to the lack of judicial
transparency, and the government‘s equation of
peaceful religious activity with religious extremism
and terrorism, it is difficult to determine how many
prisoners are being held for peaceful religious
activity or for peacefully protesting restrictions on the
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Three
family members of Rebiya Kadeer, one of the most
prominent Uighur advocates, remain in prison.
Kadeer‘s three sons, Kahar, Alim, and Ablikim, were
arrested in June 2006 to prevent them from meeting
with a visiting U.S. congressional delegation. The
following October, Kahar and Alim were tried for tax
evasion, and Alim was sentenced to seven years
imprisonment. The two were also fined a total of
over $75,000. In February 2007, Ablikim was tried
in secret on charges of ―subversion of state power‖
and later sentenced to nine years imprisonment. In
December 2007, family members were allowed to
visit Ablikim for the first time in a year. Both Alim
and Ablikim remain in prison, where they are
reported to have been tortured and abused, and
Ablikim is reported to be in poor physical health
without adequate medical care.

The officially-sanctioned Catholic Patriotic
Association (CPA) does not allow its members or
clergy to have relations or communication with the
Vatican or other foreign Catholic organizations. This
prohibition continues to strain relations between the
CPA and the unregistered Catholic Church in China
and between the Chinese government and the Holy
See. Despite the official policy, an estimated 90
percent of CPA bishops and priests are secretly
ordained by the Vatican and in many provinces, CPA
and unregistered Catholic clergy and congregations
work closely together. In some cases, the Vatican
and the Chinese government have worked together on
the selections of bishops. For example, in September
2007, bishops were ordained in Beijing, Guizhou,
and three other dioceses with the approval of both the
government and the Vatican. These ordinations
reversed a trend of the government appointing
bishops without Vatican approval. Nonetheless, the
Chinese government took active steps to halt
distribution of Pope Benedict‘s 2007 open letter to
Chinese Catholics, including twice detaining Bishop
Jia Zhiguo of Hebei province, and beating him while
in custody, to prevent him from distributing the letter.
In that letter, the Pope recognized that, although there
have been some improvements, ―grave limitations‖
on religious freedom in China remain, which the
Church cannot accept. Nevertheless, the Pope called
on Chinese Catholics to adopt the approach of
―respectful and constructive dialogue.‖

More recently, Bishop Jia was arrested again on March 30,
2009 to prevent him from meeting with another
bishop who had reconciled with the Vatican. Chinese
officials objected to the relationship between the two
bishops because it was ―desired by a foreign power,‖
the Vatican, not by the government and the CPA.
The Chinese government continues to maintain that
normalization of ties with the Holy See will begin
only if the Vatican revokes its diplomatic relations
with Taiwan and agrees to cease its ―use of religion
as a means to interfere in China‘s internal affairs.‖

In the past year, harassment and detention of
Catholics in China, especially unregistered bishops
and priests, continued. The whereabouts of Catholic
Bishop Wu Qinjing of the Zhouzhi diocese, who was
detained in March 2007 by authorities in Shaanxi
province, remain unknown. Bishop Wu was ordained
in 2006 with Vatican approval, but without the
approval of the local CPA. Fr. Wang Zhong is still
serving the three-year sentence imposed in 2007 for
reportedly organizing a ceremony to consecrate a
new church registered with the government. In May
2008, Fr. Zhang Jianlin and Fr. Zhang Li were
detained in Hebei province as they travelled to a
well-known shrine in Shanghai; they reportedly
remain in some sort of detention at this time.
Although Bishop Yao Ling was released in January
2009 after serving a two year sentence, at least 40
Roman Catholic bishops or priests remain
imprisoned, detained, or disappeared, including the
elderly Bishop Su Zhimin, who has been in prison, in
detention, under house arrest, or under strict
surveillance since the 1970s. In addition, there is still
no information on the whereabouts of Bishop Shi
Enxiang, who was arrested in April 2001.

Members and leaders of unregistered
Protestant groups in China continued to face
harassment and harsh punishments, including
detention, fines, beatings, confiscation of property,
arrest, and mistreatment and torture in custody. In
the last year, according to credible reports, 764
Protestant leaders and adherents were arrested for
some period of time during the past year, 35 of whom
were sentenced to terms of imprisonment over one
year, including in China‘s infamous ―re-education
through labor‖ system.

The State Department estimates that ―thousands of house church members
were detained for short periods in the last year.
Arrests for and harassment of peaceful Protestant
religious activity occurred in at least 17 provinces
and two municipalities, with the most incidents
occurring in Henan, Xinjiang, Shandong, Hebei, and
Zhejiang provinces. Members of unregistered
churches that the government deems ―evil cults‖ were
the most vulnerable to detention. An extrajudicial
security apparatus called the 6-10 Office, which was
started to monitor and suppress Falun Gong activity,
has broadened its mandate reportedly to include
groups that self-identify as Protestant.

The Chinese government also took active
steps to impede religious groups and human rights
defenders access to visiting foreign delegations and
overseas contact, threatening to ―strike hard‖ against
anyone involved with ―hostile‖ foreign groups.
During the Olympics, religious leaders were
prevented from attending a worship service with
President George W. Bush, and several human rights
defenders active in religious cases were prevented
from meeting with visiting Members of Congress.
Pastor Zhang ―Bike‖ Mingxuan, head of the Chinese
House Church Alliance, was prevented from meeting
a visiting European Parliament delegation and
reporters covering the Beijing Olympics Games.
Over the past year Pastor Mingxuan was detained
several times, forcibly removed from Beijing during
the Olympics, fined, evicted from his apartment, and
his sons were beaten by police. In March 2009,
Pastor Mingxuan was arrested again in Beijing and
sent to Henan Province to be questioned and
detained.

In the lead up to the Beijing Olympic
Games, the government‘s repression of house church
and unregistered Protestant groups increased
dramatically. Many house churches report that they
were asked by local public security officials to
disband during the Games, especially high-profile
congregations that met near Olympic venues. The
Beijing Gospel Church, with a membership of 1,000
people, was raided by officials from four different
agencies in May 2008. The congregation‘s minister,
Pastor Gao Zhen, was detained, interrogated, and
then released. Also in May, local police raided the
Chengdu Qiuyu Blessings Church near Shangliu,
Chengdu Province, telling church they were
suspected of ―illegal religious practices‖ and
confiscating Bibles, hymnals, and other educational
materials. Five members of a church associated with
the Honghui Coal Mine in Baiyin City, Gansu
Province, were detained in June 2008. They were
sentenced to administrative detention and forced to
pay fines of $145. Several prominent Christian
leaders were placed under strict surveillance during
the Olympic Games last August including Christian
writer Yu Jie and Pastor Zhang Mingxuan and his
wife. Approximately 100 foreign Christians were
detained, interrogated, and eventually expelled from
the country during the Olympics on charges of
―illegal religious activity.‖

The Chairman of the XUAR, Ismail
Tiliwaldi, has urged local police and religious affairs
officials to ―exercise stronger management‖ over
Protestantism and Catholicism and to guard strictly
against foreign infiltration and sabotage. In May
2007, police in the XUAR detained 30 house church
leaders who were meeting with foreign religious
leaders; those detained were mistreated or, in some
cases beaten in custody before they were released. In
April 2008, XUAR police arrested 46 Christians
while they worshipped in a house church. They were
forced to pay fines, study government handbooks on
religious policy, and were sentenced to 15 days of
administrative detention. Osman Imin (also known
as Wusimanyiming) was arrested in November 2007
and sentenced to two years of ―re-education through
labor‖ on charges that he assisted foreigners in
conducting ―illegal religious activities‖ related to
public religious expression and persuasion among the
Uighur community. Lou Yuanqi, the pastor of a
growing house church, was detained on May 17,
2008 on charges of ―utilizing superstition to
undermine the law.‖ A XUAR court refused to take
his case because of insufficient evidence; however,
he remains in detention. In January 2008, Alimjan
Himit (Alimujiang Yimiti)—a house church leader in
the XUAR who had previously worked for a foreignowned
company shut down for ―illegal religious
infiltration activities‖—was detained and charged
with subverting state power and endangering national
security. Although a court in Kashgar returned
Himit‘s case to the procuratorate due to insufficient
evidence in May 2008, he remains in detention. In
September 2008, the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention decided that Himit had been
arbitrarily detained in violation of international
standards.

Chinese officials continue to use charges of
―illegal business activity‖ to sentence house church
leaders who are involved in the printing and
distribution of Bibles and other religious materials.
In November 2007, Shi Weihan served 37 days of
criminal detention in Beijing for illegally publishing
Bibles and Christian literature. He was arrested again
in March 2008 and denied access to his lawyer until
April; in June his sentence was extended for two
months. He is currently awaiting trial. In May
2008, Pastor Dong Yutao was arrested for receiving a
shipment of illegally imported Bibles.

The Chinese government continues to
maintain a harsh campaign against adherents of the
Falun Gong spiritual movement, which it considers
an ―evil cult‖ and has banned since 1999. Police
continued to detain current and former Falun Gong
practitioners and to place them in re-education
through labor camps (RTL) without trial or in mental
health institutions. There is no credible information
on just how many Falun Gong practitioners were
imprisoned over the past decade, but some
international observers claim that they may be as
many as half of the total number of the 250,000
Chinese detained in RTL camps. Provincial officials
reportedly offer sizable rewards to anyone who
provides information leading to the arrest of a Falun
Gong practioner. In the year before the Olympic
Games, police waged a concerted campaign to harass
and detain known Falun Gong practioners and
brutally suppress their activity, an estimated 8,037
Falun Gong were detained between December 2007
and August 2008.

In February 2008, Falun Gong
practitioner Yu Zhou died in police custody. Police
claimed that he died of complications related to
diabetes, but his family claims he was healthy before
his arrest and they were denied an autopsy. In
November 2008, Xu Na, a member of Falun Gong,
and her husband were detained for possessing Falun
Gong materials, which is considered a criminal
offense. Her husband died after 11 days in detention,
and Xu Na was sentenced to three years in prison. In
May, 2008 Yang Xiyao of Yanshan county, Hebei
province, was detained after police raided his home
and found Falun Gong publications. Most recently,
in July 2008, Chen Zhenping was arrested and tried
in secret without legal representation for being a
Falun Gong practioner. She was sentenced to eight
years imprisonment.

The 6–10 Offices throughout China are
tasked with surveillance, investigations,
―transformation,‖ and detention of Falun Gong
practioners. The 6-10 office reportedly has
extrajudicial detention facilities used exclusively to
hold Falun Gong practioners who have completed
RTL terms, but who are still considered harmful.
Imprisoned Falun Gong reportedly are subject to
mistreatment and torture. The UN Special
Rapporteur on Torture reported that Falun Gong
practitioners make up two-thirds of the alleged
victims of torture. Numerous allegations of
government-sanctioned organ harvesting from
incarcerated practitioners have surfaced within the
last several years as well. Independent investigation
into the practices of a hospital in Sujiatun, Shenyang
proved inconclusive. However, based upon a report
from two prominent Canadian human rights activists,
international human rights organizations have called
for an independent investigation and for continued
international attention to allegations of organ
harvesting from prisoners. The UN Committee on
Torture, during its 2008 review of China, also called
on the government to conduct independent
investigations to clarify discrepancies in statistics
related to organ transplants and allegations of torture
of Falun Gong practitioners.

In August 2007, authorities in Hunan
Province issued provincial-level regulations to
administer folk religion venues. Folk religion, also
called ―feudal superstition,‖ has been a legal grey
area in China because it does not fall within the five
recognized religious groups (Buddhism, Daoism,
Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam), but is often
tolerated by local officials. The regulations are
significant because they offer protections for
religious practice outside the five recognized
communities and because they allow venues to
register directly with provincial government officials.
However, the new regulations allow registration only
of existing venues and stipulate that no new sites may
be built. In addition, any venue that is destroyed may
not be rebuilt unless it retains ―historical stature‖ and
―great influence.‖ The State Administration for
Religious Affairs (SARA), the government agency
tasked with overseeing most of China‘s religious life,
has established a division to deal directly with the
management of folk religions.

During the past several years, there has been
a continuing crackdown against human rights
activists, lawyers, and others who attempted to use
the Chinese legal system to defend the rights of
Chinese citizens, including those who sought to
practice their right to freedom of religion. Lawyers
have been harassed, beaten, threatened, disappeared,
or have lost their legal licenses over the past year. In
September 2007, attorney Li Heping, a prominent
religious freedom advocate, was beaten with
electronic batons for nearly five hours and ordered to
stop practicing law. He refused and his legal license
was revoked. In November 2007, human rights
lawyer Yang Maodong (also known as Guo Feixiong)
was sentenced to five years imprisonment on charges
of ―illegal business practices.‖ According to his wife
and lawyer, he has been subjected to shocks from
electric batons and other mistreatment while in
prison. Yang Maodong is the former law partner of
Gao Zhisheng, one of China‘s best known human
rights lawyers, who defended Falun Gong and
unregistered Protestants and was a vocal critic of the
Chinese government‘s human rights record. Gao
disappeared in February 2009 and his whereabouts, at
this time, remain unknown.

Before his disappearance, Gao published a report of the torture
he endured during a September 2007 interrogation.
In February 2008, police seized lawyer Teng Biao in
Beijing for questioning, warned him to stop writing
articles criticizing China's human rights record, and
threatened him with jail time and the loss of his
university job. After Teng agreed to defend Tibetans
arrested following the March 2008 protests, officials
refused to renew his legal license. On March 3,
2009, the Chinese government revoked the legal
license of Beijing‘s Yitong Law Firm, whose lawyers
handled human rights cases, including representing
unregistered house church Protestants and the Falun
Gong. Lawyers Li Subin, Liu Xiaoyuan, Zhang
Jianguo, Cheng Hai, Wen Haibo, and Yang Huiwen
were singled out for censure, in particular, because of
their human rights work.

Despite experiencing ongoing harassment,
arrest, and restrictions, human rights defenders have
had some minimal success using the legal system to
challenge official abuse or have sentences reduced.
For example, in November 2007, house church
members in Shandong province successfully filed
suit against the local public security bureau and were
awarded confiscated Bibles, computers, and other
goods taken in a raid. In September 2008, a Chengdu
church filed a suit against the local religious affairs
bureau (RAB) for closing down the church earlier in
the year. The provincial RAB reportedly later issued
a decision overturning the local bureau‘s decision. In
some cases, lawyers for the Falun Gong have also
been able to represent their clients without prior
approval from the Ministry of Justice. This
occasionally has led to reduced or suspended
sentences; however, the practice is only allowed in
Beijing and not in other parts of China.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy
Given that religious freedom and related
human rights concerns are directly related to
expanding the rule of law, security, and China‘s
compliance with international obligations, the
Commission urges the Obama Administration, as it
reviews various policy approaches, to included
religious freedom concerns in discussions at that
highest level and signal clearly that human rights are
a vital U.S. interest that will affect the flexibility and
scope of U.S.-China relations. In both bilateral
relations and in multilateral institutions where the
United States and China are members, the
Commission makes the following recommendations
concerning U.S. policy toward China.

I. Ending Human Rights Abuses in China
The U.S. government should:
fully employ all the available tools specified in
the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA)
for countries designated as ―countries of
particular concern‖ (CPCs), including sanctions
or some other commensurate action, and cease
the practice of prior Administrations of relying
on ―pre-existing sanctions‖ that do not address
specific religious freedom abuses, by issuing a
new presidential action that would focus on
either state agencies or actors who perpetuate
religious freedom abuses or on provinces or
localities where religious freedom conditions are
most egregious; and
raise publicly concerns about Chinese human
rights abuses in appropriate multilateral and
international fora, including the UN General
Assembly and Human Rights Council, and
ensure that preparations for such actions be made
at appropriately high levels with other UN
member states.

In addition, the U.S. government should
urge the Chinese government to:
end its current crackdown on religious and
spiritual groups throughout China, including
harassment, surveillance, arrest, and detention of
persons on account of their religion or belief;
torture and ill-treatment of persons in prisons,
labor camps, psychiatric facilities, and other
places of confinement; and the coercion of
individuals to renounce or condemn any religion
or belief; release all those imprisoned, detained, or
disappeared on account of their manifestation of
religious belief or activities, including Gao
Zhisheng, Xu Na, Fr. Zhang Li, Chen Zhenping,
Bishop Jia Zhiguo, Shi Weihan, Alimjan Himit,
Yang Maodong, Osman Imin, Abdukadir
Mahsum, Imam Adil Qarim, Fr. Zhang Jianlin,
Bishop Su Zhimin, and Gedhun Choekyi Nyima;
provide a full accounting of all those detained,
released, tried and sentenced in public order
disturbances in Tibet in the last year; allow
immediate access for international observers,
including the International Committee of the Red
Cross, to all acknowledged or unacknowledged
detention facilities; and implement all Tibetrelated
recommendations of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Committee
on Torture, and the Special Rapporteurs on
Torture, Freedom of Religion or Belief,
Extrajudicial and Summary Executions, and
Human Rights Defenders;
cease the use of torture and implement and
mechanisms so that alleged incidents are
consistently and impartially investigated,
evidence procured through torture is excluded at
trial, mistreatment of North Korean refugees in
detention is halted and no asylum-seeker in
China is returned to a country where they face a
real possibility of torture;
issue a national decree that guarantees the right
of minors to manifest their religion or belief and
the right of parents to ensure the religious and
moral education of their children;
establish a mechanism for reviewing cases of
persons, including religious leaders, detained
under suspicion of, or charged with, offenses
relating to state security, disturbing social order,
―counterrevolutionary‖ or ―splittist‖ activities, or
organizing or participating in ―illegal‖ gatherings
or religious activities; and
extend an unconditional invitation to visit China
to the UN Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of Lawyers and Judges to visit
China with full access in compliance with the
terms of reference required by the Special
Rapporteur, and determine dates for visits to
China by both the Special Rapporteur on the
Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, with
full access in compliance with the terms of
reference required by the Special Rapporteurs.

II. Building on Existing Efforts to Improve
the Rule of Law in China

The U.S. government should make the
promotion of the rule of law a greater priority of U.S.
human rights diplomacy in China by continuing to
urge the Chinese government to:
ratify and implement the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
China signed in 1998, without reservations
undermining religious freedom protections, and
sign and ratify the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR;
amend Article 36 of the Constitution to explicitly
protect the right not only to believe but to
manifest one‘s religious belief without state
interference;
amend or repeal Article 306 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, which has been used against
attorneys who have vigorously defended the
rights of their clients;
amend or repeal Article 111 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, which labels as ―state secrets‖
any published information deemed embarrassing
to the government, and raise the issue of China‘s
use of ―state security‖ as a rationale for
suppressing dissent in bilateral and multilateral
discussions and exchanges;
repeal the Guiding Opinion on Lawyers
Handling Collective Cases and similar local
regulations that interfere with the ability of
lawyers to represent the interests of their clients
in collective cases, including cases involving the
defense of religious freedom or related rights or
violations on account of religion or belief;
abolish the system of re-education through labor
(RTL) camps and all other administration and
extrajudicial detention centers, including the
―transformation through reeducation‖ facilities
of the 6-10 office;
revise the Ministry of Justice‘s ―Methods for the
Management of Lawyers Professional Licenses‖
and similar local regulations to ensure that
lawyers‘ annual registration is not subject to
political considerations or other arbitrary factors
and make sure that no lawyer should be denied
renewal of registration on the basis of the cases
he or she has represented or is representing;
repeal Article 300 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, which deals with individuals accused of
crimes associated with ―evil cults,‖ and also its
associated legislation, the Decision of the
Standing Committee of the National People‘s
Congress on Banning Heretical Cult
Organizations, Preventing and Punishing Cult
Activities; and end the use of government filters on Web sites
and e-mail and remove official restrictions on
Internet message boards and text messaging,
including the blockage of access to certain Web
sites related to religion, belief, or human rights;
and revise the September 2000 State Council
regulations on Internet Content Providers (ICPs)
and offer ICPs clear and consistent guidelines for
Web site content and usage to ensure that
Chinese law and practice in this area conform to
international standards on the freedoms of
opinion and expression.

III. Building Programs to Support Chinese
Rights Defenders

To strengthen the ability of Chinese lawyers
and activists to defend religious freedom or related
rights or violations on account of religion or belief
and encourage a vibrant civil society, media, and the
rule of law the U.S. government should:
through the State Department‘s Human Rights
and Democracy Fund, institute new programs
that:
--increase the capacity and networking
ability of non-governmental organizations in
China that address issues of human rights,
including religious freedom, as well as the
freedoms of expression, association, and
assembly;
--expand contacts between U.S. human
rights experts and Chinese government
officials, academics, representatives of both
registered and unregistered religious
communities, and non-governmental
organizations on international standards
relating to the right of freedom of religion or
belief; on the importance and benefits of
upholding human rights, including religious
freedom; on reforms to the Chinese criminal
justice system, including planned changes in
the criminal procedure code; and on the role
of defense lawyers; and
--increase consultations between
international human rights experts and
Chinese officials, judges and lawyers on the
compatibility of Chinese laws, regulations,
and practices with international standards on
freedom of religion or belief;
through the Human Rights Defenders Fund,
make support available to Chinese lawyers and
others who defend the internationally recognized
rights of individuals and communities targeted
because of their religious belief or practice.

IV. Expanding U.S. Public Diplomacy and
Human Rights Programs in Tibet and
Xinjiang

The U.S. government should:
 urge the Chinese government to allow a U.S.
government presence, such as consulates in
Lhasa, Tibet and Urumqi, Xinjiang which could
monitor religious freedom and other human
rights conditions;

 appoint promptly a Special Coordinator on
Tibetan issues at the State Department in order to
press Beijing to end the criminalization of
peaceful advocacy in Tibet, to engage in
constructive dialogue over the future of Tibetans
within China, and to coordinate with other
nations on issues related to Tibet for bilateral
discussion and multilateral diplomacy; and
strengthen efforts to highlight conditions faced
by Uighur Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists by:
--increasing educational opportunities in the
United States for religious and other leaders
from these regions, in order to enhance their
understanding of religious freedom and
other human rights according to
international standards;
--creating legal clinics to assist those in
areas with high concentrations of Uighur
Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists to enforce
their human rights under the Chinese
Constitution and international law, similar to
existing programs that serve other ethnic
minority areas in China;
--giving political and financial support to
programs that address chronic needs, as
articulated by the Tibetan and Uighur
people, in such areas as education, work
force development, language and culture
preservation, environmental protection, and
sustainable development; and
--as the Broadcasting Board of Governors
modifies its global priorities, ensuring
continued availability of funds to maintain
appropriate Tibetan and Uighur language
broadcasting through the Voice of America
and Radio Free Asia.

V. The U.S.-China Senior Strategic Dialogue
& Human Rights Protections
Within the planning and structure of the new
Senior Strategic Dialogue, the U.S. government
should:

 prioritize human rights and religious freedom
issues as key issues in the Senior Dialogue‘s
agenda, in addition to raising them in a regular
human rights dialogue; raise a full range of
religious freedom concerns in high-level
discussions in each session and, where
appropriate, invite human rights experts from
within the State Department and other U.S.
government agencies, as well as nongovernmental
experts, to participate in both pre-
Dialogue planning and negotiating sessions; and

 ensure that religious freedom priorities raised in
the Senior Dialogue are implemented through
appropriate U.S. government foreign assistance
programs on such issues as legal reform, civil
society capacity-building, public diplomacy, and
cultural and religious preservation and
exchanges.
In addition, the U.S. Congress should:
ensure that congressional oversight of U.S.-
China human rights diplomacy is maintained by
requiring the State Department to submit a
regular public report to the appropriate
congressional committees detailing issues of
concern discussed during the Senior Dialogue, or
any future bilateral human rights dialogues, and
describing progress made toward a series of
―benchmarks‖ initiated by Congress.

VI. Protecting and Aiding North Korean
Refugees in China
The U.S. government should urge the
Chinese government to:
uphold its international obligations to
protect asylum seekers, by 1) working with
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) to establish a mechanism to
confer temporary asylum on those seeking
such protection and to permit safe transport
to countries of final asylum; 2) providing the
UNHCR with unrestricted access to
interview North Korean nationals in China;
and 3) ensuring that the return of any
migrants pursuant to any bilateral agreement
does not violate China‘s obligations under
the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967
Protocol or under Article 3 of the
Convention Against Torture;
allow international humanitarian
organizations greater access to North
Koreans in China, to address growing social
problems, abuses, and exploitation
experienced by this vulnerable population,
and work with regional and European allies
to articulate a consistent and clear message
about China‘s need to protect North Korean
refugees; allow greater numbers of North Korean
migrants who desire resettlement to have
safe haven and secure transit until they reach
third countries; and
grant legal residence to the North Korean
spouses of Chinese citizens and their
children.