Asia Times
By Peter Lee
China and the United States have recently engaged in an exchange of concessions and amicable statements designed to ratchet down the tensions of the past few months.
On the surface, China seems to have received little out of the bargain. However, as it deals with the potential for havoc from two looming transitions – in the Tibetan diaspora and on Taiwan – Beijing may feel that it has achieved an important breakthrough.
On March 30, China gave a measure of support to two cherished US diplomatic objectives.
First, Washington claimed (and Beijing did not deny) that China would participate in discussions relating to new United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iran.
Also, China announced that President Hu Jintao would participate in the non-proliferation conference convened by the United States in New York in April to advance President Barack Obama’s aim of restructuring the US-led global security regime around eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons.
Time will tell how much effective support or resistance China brings to these efforts. For the time being, however, China’s harvest appears to be rather meager.
It will join the sanctions effort against its key economic and geopolitical ally in the Middle East – Iran – and be present at the creation of the planned fourth iteration of US geopolitical leadership in the past 70 years, this time centered on non-proliferation (instead of combating fascism, communism, or terrorism).
The most widely reported quid pro quo – that Hu will be spared the embarrassment of China being labeled a currency manipulator during his US visit, so Beijing can revalue the yuan over the summer on its own terms and gird its loins for an international battle over the exchange rate in time for the US mid-term election season – seems scant compensation.
However, the Chinese government has been publicly clear and consistent over several months concerning what it really wanted from the United States: reaffirmation of the US one-China policy as it relates to Taiwan and Tibet.
A visit in early March by the Obama administration’s top two China hands, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and Jeffrey Bader, senior director for the US National Security Council for Asian Affairs, failed to achieve the desired result. Apparently they came to Beijing primed to talk about the US pre-occupation with Iran sanctions and nothing else. This prompted the Chinese to go to the extent of producing former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger for a photo-op with Vice Premier Li Keqiang, to emphasize the People’s Republic’s (PRC) nostalgia for the strategic engagement of the Richard Nixon years.
Based on two special postings on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, the PRC believes it finally got what it needed.
Even as the Obama administration was, with cautious exultation, notifying the press that China would participate in the Iran sanctions exercise. On March 30, in its news section, the ministry reported: “US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg Reiterates the One China Policy”. [1]
Its account of remarks by Steinberg at the US Press Club “in the small hours of March 30″ stated:
The centerpiece is the one-China policy, which has not changed. The US side does not support independence for Taiwan and opposes unilateral attempts to change the status quo. The US side welcomes the continued improvement and development of cross-Straits relations. The US side hopes that the two sides of the Straits will resolve the issue peacefully through dialogue. The US side reiterated that it considers Tibet to be a part of China and does not support independence for Tibet.
The ministry also specially excerpted a passage from spokesperson Qin Gang’s regular press conference expressing satisfaction with Steinberg’s “positive remarks” on Taiwan and Tibet.
China’s obsession with the one-China policy is, on one level, difficult to appreciate.
Western governments, media outlets and human-rights organizations do relish pulling the dragon’s whiskers on the issues of Taiwan and Tibet. However, as a matter of realpolitik, China’s economic and geopolitical clout ensures that its interests in these two regions are acknowledged as paramount.
However, transitions are looming in Tibet and Taiwan and, with them the possibility that not only new leaders but new paradigms will emerge. more …
